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Abstract
This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological
evolution. First the causal and statistical perspectives on evolutionary fitness
are analyzed, finding them to implicitly depend on each other, and hence
cannot be individually fundamental. It is argued that this is an instance of
a relativistic perspective over evolutionary phenomena. New accounts of
fitness, the struggle for life, and Natural Selection are developed under this
interpretation. This biological relativism is unique in that it draws from Gen-
eral Relativity in physics, unlike previous theories that drew upon statistical
mechanics or Newtonian dynamics. A mathematical law of evolutionary
change, as well as new theoretical biological concepts to underpin it, are
likewise developed. The law and theory are then applied to give examples
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of how both cornerstones and edge cases can be understood using these new
methods. Using General Relativistic Biology provides fresh insight into evo-
lution, all while preserving the core, canonical scientific research program.
1 Introduction
This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological evolution.
I start by discussing the problem posed by the causal and statistical interpretations
of fitness. Though the the two camps appear diametrically opposed, it is argued
that both implicitly rely upon the other. To find middle ground the causal and
statistical interpretations of fitness are recast as relativistic perspectives of a single
fundamental fitness property. This new concept of relativistic fitness will then be
developed into a general theory of evolution by drawing on General Relativity
from physics.
At first blush this theory could be seen as following in the historical footsteps
of physics: just as Newtonian Gravity gave way to Einstein’s General Relativity,
so too will the Newtonian model of Natural Selection give way to a relativistic
model. While I invite this comparison, mere historical similarity will neither pro-
vide the foundation nor philosophical sophistication required for a theory meant
to be a serious alternative to Darwinian evolution.
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Therefore, after appropriating the methods and framework of physics, exam-
ples and implementations that follow from the new biological theory will be given
to demonstrate its conceptual mileage for philosophy of biology, theoretic biol-
ogy and, potentially, practical scientific application. Besides showing the range
and depth of the theory, it also serves to provide food for biological thought. This
utility in solving problems and stimulating new ways to think about evolution
lends plausiblity to describing biological evolution in these relativistic terms.
By tracing from conceptual foundations to practical results, the strategy is to
create a new unified picture, a paradigm that provides an understanding of evolu-
tion that preserves and expands upon the successes of Darwinism.
2 Evolution and Causality
The fundamental explanatory scheme of biological evolution uses the concept of
fitness to understand Natural Selection. Over the last decade or so there’s been a
debate centered over the causal status of biological fitness. Let us grant each of the
two main camps, the statisticalists, such as Matthen and Ariew (2002) and Walsh
et al. (2002), and the causalists, such as Stephen (2004) and Northcott (2010), their
own version of fitness: Statistical Fitness and Causal Fitness. What are these two
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fitnesses? According to (Walsh, 2010, 147-8), Causal “Fitness is (or measures)
the propensity of a trait type to change in relative frequency in a population. . .
Natural selection, it seems to follow, is a population-level causal process; it is
that process caused, and measured, by fitness distribution.” Statistical “fitness is
a mere statistical, noncausal property of trait type. . . Fitness distribution explains
but does not cause the changes in a population undergoing natural selection.”
Put more prosaically, Causal Fitness is competitive: a more fit organism will
outcompete a less fit one, on average, as a causal result of their traits. It is com-
pared Newtonian Gravity in that it is a fundamental force that causes change. Just
as the gravity of a mass has an effect on the motion of another mass, the fitness of
one population will have a biological effect on other populations.
Statistical fitness, on the other hand, describes the environmental situation:
fitness is statistically correlated with changes in the environment, but does not
cause them. This is compared to Statistical Mechanics in that it acts like a gas.
A gas, if otherwise not acted upon, will reach some average temperature, even if
one part was originally warmer. The distribution of heat is not due to some causal
process of the gas, but of the underlying motion of the particles. Similarly a
population organisms may distribute itself through an environment, but this is due
to the underlying physical properties of that system and not some causal property
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of the population.
Without a reconciliation between these causally opposed viewpoints, we have
a fundamental disagreement over how we understand the basic scientific concepts
of evolutionary biology.
2.1 The Hard Problem of Evolution
Though each claims to be the ultimate measure, as Ramsey (2013) and Hitchcock
and Velasco (2014) recently note, this research into fitness has not yielded agree-
ment and the arguments often go past each other (Ramsey, 2013, 10). Moreover,
while each position solves certain questions within evolution, neither gets at the
underlying hard causal problem. Lets first take a look at the Causalist position:
The Causalists hold that Natural Selection causes evolutionary change, but
is independent of the underlying physics. The question is how does this change
occur, since Natural Selection is a non-physical force? It would have to be a
non-physical force causing some physical result. This is problematic because
even if we can’t currently describe the entire physical reality with physics, any
given small-scale phenomenon can be adequately explained with a physical cause.
So, without a connection between biological and physical causality, given no
environmental-level Cartesian pineal gland, there is no way for Natural Selec-
5
tion to have noticeable physical consequences. Hence, since Natural Selection is
fundamental for the Causalists, there is no effective causal structure.
On the other hand, Statisticalists describe Natural Selection as shorthand for
the underlying causal physics. Since we can’t describe physics to sufficient com-
plexity, we use Natural Selection as a heuristic. However if Natural Selection
were just a heuristic, then it should only work under a limited scope and fail when
it is applied otherwise. Like any other heuristic or shorthand, it should work very
well but only in a few cases. On the contrary, the use of evolutionary concepts
is only growing and being extended across many different fields, such as com-
puter science, psychology and linguistics. Natural Selection has proven to be a
robust concept, much more than a mere convenience. Therefore the Statisticalist,
in treating Natural Selection as a heuristic, has oversimplified the phenomenon by
failing to capture its depth.
Given these difficulties neither side can claim fundamentality. The Causalists
fail without the physical interaction, and the Statisticalists fail without the biolog-
ical sophistication. Since the ontological gap between biology and physics is yet
too great, we are left with a dualistic understanding of Natural Selection.
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2.2 Bridging Statistical and Causal Fitness
What has been missed is that the distinction between Statistical Fitness and Causal
Fitness cannot be maintained universally. The debate, as described below, has
been over two sides of the same coin.
First note that the two views do not differ in their results, in spite of their
different explanatory schemes. Given some biological adaptation, both causal or
statistical explanations will conclude with the adaptation having a qualitatively
similar fitness. That is, while the measurements and explanations may be conven-
tions of their respective systems, the qualitative conclusion of high or low fitness
is common to both theories. A causally high fitness for some organisms will al-
ways correspond to a statistically high fitness for those organisms, and vice versa.
These results hint at some deeper connection, but this is not represented by either
viewpoint.
Second, let’s discuss causal and statistical descriptions of fitness. Take a causal
biological story: assume that a missletoe plant (or population of missletoe) has an
adaptation that makes it more competitively fit. The adaptation could be for any
trait, but let’s say the trait is that its berries taste better to birds that distribute
seeds.
These tastier berries are a biological adaptation and, by definition, are the re-
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sult of genetic mutations. But where did the mutation come from? Mutations are
caused by environmental factors, such as errors in copying genetic material—a
factor of the cellular environment—or by UV or nuclear radiation. Hence, al-
though this is a causal story, it begins with a non-biologically-causal statistical
anomaly. Insofar as all causal stories rely on mutations at their start, all causal
fitness is dependent upon the background environmental situation.
Now lets look at a statistical biological story. Again take the two different or-
ganisms (or populations) of missletoe, and one with tastier berries. A statisticalist
wants to say that the plant with tastier berries has a higher statistical fitness due to
the situation the plants lived in and not caused by the berries being tastier.
However, note that the statisticalist still has to identify the missletoe with
tastier berries, as compared to the missletoe without the tasty berries, in deter-
mining fitness. But how did the statisticalist identify the missletoe berries, or any
other part of the missletoe’s life or reproducductive cycle in order to determine
the fitness? Life and reproduction are causal interpretations of biology. They are
not statistical or physical terms. Physics does not inherently involve biological
reproduction or life. To just describe the situation, the greater biological ontology
must already be presupposed. Hence the statistical position depends on the causal
biological concepts and cannot exist independently of them.
8
Therefore there is no causal theory of fitness without already having a statisti-
cal understanding and there is no statistical theory of fitness without a prior causal
understanding. The two theories are mutually dependent, as both are essential to
each other and our understanding of them. Specifically, being mutually dependent
means that fitness cannot be explained by one, the other, or a mere combination of
both causal and statistical theory in a mixed explanation (Ylikoski, 2013). Hence
even if we were prepared to accept a dualist position, it wouldn’t apply to this
situation.
2.3 The Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness
Given that neither theory is fundamental or distinct, they cannot be used to explain
fitness. To explain fitness we would need a more fundamental, well understood
theory than the phenomenon in question, which we do not have. Still, fitness is
currently described in terms of the interconnected causal and statistical theories
and we don’t want to lose our understanding of fitness even if there are prob-
lems with those theories. So, instead of explaining fitness causally or statistically,
what can be done is to interpret fitness causally or interpret fitness statistically.
The suggestion is that the causal and statistical methods are the ways fitness is
phenomenologically interpreted, not explained, to then understand evolutionary
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phenomena.
Though there is no definition of fitness yet — that will come that later — we
can now state an equality law describing a basic property of fitness and how we
interpret it:
Law of the Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness: there is only one kind of
fitness and it is our perspective that changes.
This means that we have the freedom to choose between the causal or statistical
method of analysis as the need arises.
One important aspect of the law is that it makes clear that we are not inde-
pendent, objective observers when it comes to determining fitness. It is our phe-
nomenological perspective that determines which analysis we favor and not some-
thing more fundamental about either position. By placing us in-between the sta-
tisticalist and causalist positions, it allows us, as an active observer, to bridge the
gap between the causal-biological and statistical-physical explanatory schemes.
Secondly, the lack of an absolute perspective demonstrates an important con-
sequence about our epistemic relationship to biological fitness. Though we are
not independent observers of fitness, we are all non-independent observers in the
same way. Since everyone draws on both accounts, even if only implicitly, we all
have the same epistemic foundation for our understanding of fitness.
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Lastly note that the equality law explains the qualitative correspondence be-
tween the results of the different fitness theories: each is describing the same
property, but from a different phenomenological perspective.
2.4 Struggle and Fitness
To further develop this account of fitness, some historical insight is helpful. (Bowler,
1976, 632) identified two different types of biological struggle that existed in Dar-
win’s writings, calling them struggle (a) and (b):
(a) “This is the real core of the idea of a struggle for existence; for natural selec-
tion to work at all, those individuals with favorable variations must compete
with and supplant those which are not so favored.”
(b) “. . . this emerges as the struggle against challenges imposed by the changing
nature and limited supply of the other species which serve as food.”
As you can see, Bowler’s (a) and (b), and indeed Darwin, foreshadow the contem-
porary distinction between causal and statistical theories. Note, though, Darwin’s
theories were developed in terms of struggle, not fitness.
This suggests a mapping: let us define a struggle corresponding to each fit-
ness. We can view the struggles for life as either an environmental struggle or
11
causal struggle. Since these struggles are based on the fitnesses, the difference
between environmental and causal struggle is also a matter of perspective. Bio-
logical fitness determines how much, how difficult, that struggle is for an organism
or population: the fitness is a measure of an organism’s or population’s resistance
to struggles.
3 Formalizing Evolution
3.1 Restricted Biological Relativity
With this relation between the struggle for life and fitness we will have the be-
ginning of a new theory of evolutionary biology. To build this theory I’ll start by
postulating some scientific principles which will lead to a formal foundation for
the evolutionary theory. The theory will be universal in the sense that the same
concepts of struggle and fitness apply without variation in different places and
times, and across different species and environments.
It is not obvious that this is likely or possible. Some species or environments
may be better for studying evolutionary struggle than other species or environ-
ments. This is to claim that different evolutionary standards could apply to certain
species or in different environments. Certain biological formalisms would apply
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at one time, and then not at others, making a universality impossible.
For example, note that many, if not all, current theories of evolution include
drift (Plutynski, 2007; Rosenberg and Bouchard, 2010). Evolutionary drift is often
defined in terms of changes, e.g. changes in gene frequency, in a population not
due to Natural Selection. Hence the inclusion of this kind of drift in evolutionary
theory indicates that the struggle for life, with respect to Natural Selection, cannot
apply universally.
Given this consideration, we can provisionally specify environments in which
organisms and populations follow a prescribed struggle for life. Let’s start with
a controlled environment, one in which we determine who struggles and who
doesn’t. This is selective breeding and is an instance of human selection. As Dar-
win noted (Darwin, 1964, 61) there is nothing unique to human selection in that
the exact same controlled conditions could have arisen without us in nature. Hence
we can treat these cases, ones that are naturally occurring and act as if they were
a controlled environment, in the same way as human controlled environments.
Being under control means acting regularly, that is, according to some fixed,
formalizable, scheme. Either the situation is stable, or changing in a regular way.
Hence, for any such environment, that environment must too be acting relative to
some formalizable rules. We can therefore state this as a principle:
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Restricted Principle of Biological Relativity: the same laws of evolution will
apply across ecosystems that are uniformly changing.
The reason that this principle is restricted is that it is limited to ecosystems that
are stable or changing in a regular way. Tutt’s classic example of the peppered
moths during the British Industrial Revolution illustrates this well: the environ-
ment was stable except for the single changing factor of sort that directly affected
the light and dark colored moths’ camouflage (Tutt, 1896, 307). Over 50 years the
light colored moths became much less prevalent as compared to the dark moths,
since they were now less camouflaged in the darkened environment.
If we consider an ecosystem that is changing in a non-regular way, such as
with the introduction of a new competitor, then we will not be able to formalize
the system under the Restricted Principle. We will have to wait and see the com-
petitor’s effect, if any, and observer if the ecosystem has reacted in a regular way.
If it has, then this new ecosystem would fall under the Restricted Principle. Hence
the transition from one stable environment to another is outside the scope of the
Restricted Principle of Biological Relativity.
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3.2 The General Principle of Biological Relativity
We can extend the Restricted Principle of Relativity to its limit by imagining a
combination of all the stable and regularly changing environments together. Any
formalism that applied across this group would be a fundamental evolutionary
theory relative to the uniformly changing environments. If there was a way to
include irregularly changing environments along with the regularly changing ones,
then we would have the basis for a general theory of biology.
The Law of the Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness allows us to do just
this.
Recall that the Equality Law implies that statistical struggle and competi-
tive struggle yield the same effect on fitness. This means we may account for
changes in the environment as if those changes were due to a new competitor, or,
conversely, we may account for a new competitor as a statistical environmental
change. So no matter what changes occur, there is a formalization scheme. Hence
we can explain the transition from a regularly changing environment to an ap-
parent irregularly changing one, and back, by switching interpretive schemes as
needed.
Considering the famous moths again, we can imagine a time before the in-
dustrial revolution. At that point, the soot on the trees would have been a new
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environmental factor that caused an irregular statistical change in what was the
prior, uniform environment. However, if we imagine how the moths would have
faired if the birds merely preferred to eat light colored moths from the start, and
were good at catching them regardless of the soot, then we would arrive at a simi-
lar situation. We can treat these two cases, the one with the environmental change
and the one where the birds just are better at catching light moths, as equivalent
under the Equality Law. Therefore, since the birds’ uniform preference is formal-
izable under the restricted principle, so too must the changing of pre-industrial to
industrial environment be formalizable as well.
Therefore taking the Law of the Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness to-
gether with the Restricted Principle of Biological Relativity allow us to extend our
formalism to all environments. This gives us the General Principle of Biological
Relativity:
General Principle of Biological Relativity: All ecologies are essentially equiv-
alent for the formulation of the general laws of biology.
Given new conceptions of fitness, struggle and Natural Selection that satisfy the
Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness and the General Principle of Biological
Relativity, we will have a basis for a general evolutionary theory.
To begin, notice that the above relationship between fitness and struggle is
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abstract in that fitness is defined as a resistance to struggle. Hence there is no
reliance on any particular biological phenomena, such as reproduction or death.
A theory that makes use of such a relation between fitness and struggle will be
independent of any contingent evolutionary history. The next step is to develop a
theoretic implementation that satisfies these conditions.
4 Relativistic Biology
The reader will likely have noticed my regular use of “relativity.” I have done this
to highlight the similarity between the biological evolutionary theory presented
here and physical relativity theory.
Recall that Einstein developed General Relativity by unifying the two different
concepts of mass — inertial and gravitational — that existed at the time. Though
inertial mass always equalled the gravitational mass, and vice versa, there was no
formal physical relation between the two. Both kinds of mass were needed, but at
different times for different experiments. Einstein’s “law of the equality of inertial
and gravitational mass,” (Einstein, 1961, 77) declared that there was only one kind
of mass, though they were distinguished by our perspective on the situation. This
perspective based relativity is described in the famous ‘Space Elevator’ thought
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experiment. The above, “Law of the Equality of Statistical and Causal Fitness,”
was modeled after Einstein’s Equality Law.
Also note the above General Principle of Biological Relativity,
all ecologies are essentially equivalent for the formulation of the gen-
eral laws of biology
and Einstein’s (Einstein, 1961, 108):
The following statement corresponds to the fundamental idea of the
general principle of relativity: “All Gaussian co-ordinate systems are
essentially equivalent for the formulation of the general laws of na-
ture.”
Einstein argued for his General Principle of Relativity by combining his equality
law with the accepted notion of classical relativity, which he represented with
his Restricted Principle of Relativity (Einstein, 1961, 16). Likewise, the General
Principle of Biological Relativity was developed by combining the equality law
with an accepted notion, represented by the Restricted Principle of Biological
Relativity.
I wish to use this comparison to motivate a new relation between fitness, strug-
gle and Natural Selection as similar to physical mass, acceleration and force. The
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new relationship will enable the theory below to have immediate theoretical and
practical results.
4.1 Natural Selection = fitness × struggle
The relationship between mass, acceleration and force can be described: F =
ma. Acceleration is the change in velocity over time. Mass is the resistance to
acceleration. Force is what causes a mass to accelerate.
Following this example we then define fitness as resistance to struggle, and
Natural Selection as: Natural Selection = fitness × struggle.1 Now the task
is to biologically interpret this equation such that it satisfies the above General
Principle and Equality Law. With these new definitions we will be able to apply
the relativistic concepts to evolutionary phenomena and recover scientific results,
which is the subject of Section 5 below.
4.2 Struggle, Routine and Acceleration
According to the physical equation, F = ma, and the biological one, N = fs,
there should be a correspondence between struggle and acceleration. Note that
1Though this is Newton’s 2nd Law, it can be used under relativity by substituting relativistic
mass for inertial mass in F = ma.
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acceleration is the change in the rate of motion, the velocity. Struggle is then de-
fined as the change in the rate of phenotypic change. As this definition is abstract,
an interpretation follows.
A sense of the word “life” from C.S. Lewis helps explain what is meant here.
This sense of life consists of the Routine, the general ‘way of’ life, of the indi-
vidual (Lewis, 1960, 274). In terms of people, Lewis gives the examples from
Aristotle of the “nomadic, agricultural, the fisher’s, or the huntsman’s” life, as
each consists of different routines.
If we apply this sense of routine with respect to evolution, basic difficulties
have to do with the everyday tasks that organisms face. Generally this could
include the way that individuals gather food, find shelter, avoid predators, etc. For
the missletoe this includes taking water and nutrients from the host tree, doing
photosynthesis and producing berries. Notice that this sort of difficulty is not
strictly Tennyson’s “nature red in tooth and claw.” It works just as well being
selfish (Dawkins, 2006) as being genial (Roughgarden, 2009). Also important is
that reproducing with a degree of variation ought to be included as a routine of a
population.
We can also view the routine, everyday tasks as the difficulties that the individ-
ual has already evolved to resist. The missletoe depends upon water and nutrients,
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and has satisfied this dependency by evolving a way to acquire these requirements
through parasitism on trees.
It is not this sense of daily difficulty, the routine of the individual, in the equa-
tion N = fs. The struggle, s, indicates a change in this routine of an individual’s
or population’s daily life. Struggle is something over and above the everyday
difficulties in the routines of the individual or population. When a new Natural
Selective force, e.g. a new competitor, is introduced, this changes the routines
of a population. This change in everyday life will force the population to either
adapt or die off. In this way we have a evolutionary biological interpretation of
the abstract mathematical variable s in N = fs.
4.3 Fitness, Resistance and Mass
Mass can be understood as how much resistance an object has to acceleration,
change in the rate of motion. Analogously, fitness is the resistance to change
in the rate of phenotypic change. Perhaps a clearer way of interpreting this is:
Fitness can be understood as how much resistance a population or individual has
to struggles. The higher a population’s fitness, the less it changes its routine;
fewer things cause it to struggle, be them perceived as competitors or statistical
evironmental changes. Another way to interpret this is that fitness is resistance
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to change in the rate of adaptation, though ‘rate of phenotypic change’ is the
fundamental concept.
To further explain the meaning of routine and fitness, it can be compared to
the Red Queen Hypothesis (Valen, 1973). The Red Queen Hypothesis states that
populations must be continually evolving in order to just keep their place in their
ecosystem. If they were to stop, they would quickly fall behind populations that
did keep evolving. Routine can be considered all the things the population does
just to keep up with its compatriots and competitors in that ecosystem. The popu-
lation, say of moths, must continually find food and shelter, avoid predators, resist
disease, and produce offspring with heredity and variation. The population’s fit-
ness would be a measure of how consistently it maintains these routines and not
fall behind the others in the system.
This description of fitness can also be described as inertial. A population’s
fitness determines how well it is able to do whatever it was doing, unless acted
upon by some new force, some new struggle that changes its routines.
Gillespie (1977) provides an interesting case because it demonstrates the non-
interpreted definition of fitness, fitness as a resistance. He showed that fitness
decreases as variance in the offspring number increases. We can view a consistent
offspring rate as one method of maintaining the rate of phenotypic change, if all
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else is equal. So, under stable conditions, it follows that increasing the variance of
the offspring rate will cause the phenotypic rate of change to fluctuate correspond-
ingly. Therefore Gillespie provided an instance of relativistic fitness: he showed,
by way of variance in offspring number, that if a population can resist a change in
the phenotypic rate of change, the population resists a drop in fitness.
Note that fitness, like mass, can apply to individuals, a population of similar
individuals or even an ensemble of dissimilar individuals. Biological relativity
makes no claim about the ontological priority of individuals or groups. Depending
upon the discussion, groups, individuals or both may be relevant. For example,
in discussing altruism one might want to talk about the fitness of a similar group,
whereas in discussing clonal organisms the individual could take priority, and
when discussing symbiotic relations groups of dissimilar organisms could take
priority. This inclusiveness is a benefit considering the diversity of life (Bouchard,
2011).
4.4 Natural Selection, Environment and Gravity
The force of Natural Selection is like the force of gravity according to Einstein’s
General Relativity. Under General Relativity gravitational force is due to the
changing shape of space-time: mass experiences acceleration due to the shape
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of space-time at that location and mass also changes space-time at its location.
Likewise, a population experiences different struggles due to a changing environ-
ment and competition at that location, and, in turn, the population changes the
environment and competition as well.
The change that a mass creates in space-time is called its gravitational field.
Following this terminology, I’ll refer to the overall challenges that a population or
individual faces, or creates, at some point in an environment2 as the Natural Se-
lection field. This field can therefore be considered aetheric, since it is pervasive,
has properties that affect populations and is the fundamental underlying structure
of Natural Selection.
An individual or population creates its own Natural Selection field—changing
the local environment and competition—by living its life, i.e. performing the rou-
tines that make up its daily existence. Conversely an individual or population has
to struggle against, exploit or work with the routines of other individuals and pop-
ulations, as well as environmental routines and patterns. Populations both struggle
against and work with the Natural Selection field that is created by them and their
environment and, in turn, change the Natural Selection field. It is equal and oppo-
2Just as in Special Relativity, where not space, but space-time, is the fundamental concept,
eventually ‘environment’ will have to be similarly reconceived.
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site. In this way Natural Selection mutually affects populations and is changed by
those populations in its environment. This account follows Abrams (2007, 2009)
in that the fitness of the population cannot be separated from the local environ-
ment, and (Glennan, 2005, 338) in that “without the activities and interactions of
these individual organisms, there are no changes”.
The change that the Natural Selection field creates can be thought of as a
pseudo-force, like relativistic gravity, since it is based upon the irreducible environmental-
competitive field, and hence this field provides the causal basis for evolutionary
change.
Note that the theory outlined here does not specify any particular biological
model or system. It treats all ecologies as equivalent for the study of biological
evolution, as is required by the General Principle above in Section 3.2. It also uses
a concept of fitness compatible with the Equality Law in Section 2.3. Hence this
theory of General Relativistic Biology can act as a law of evolutionary biology.
Insofar as F = ma does not specify a model of the solar system, N = fs
similarly has to be developed beyond these abstract grounds to be of practical use.
The rest of this essay, therefore, will be dedicated to showing applications of the
relativistic approach.
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5 Applying Relativistic Biology
With the new definition of struggle, fitness and Natural Selection, we have an evo-
lutionary formalism given by the equationN = fs. Gone are reference to survival
rates or reproduction, and hence cornerstones of evolution, such as the Survival
of the Fittest, cannot remain in their traditional forms under the relativistic view.
However, like relativity in physics, nearly all classical results will obtain in rela-
tivistic biology under normal circumstances, plus traditionally difficult edge cases
become much more manageable under the new concepts.
To start off thinking in terms of relativistic biology, consider what Darwin re-
ferred to as ‘living fossils.’ Living fossils, such as the coelacanth or the ginkgo
plant, have basically remained unchanged for tens, if not hundreds of millions of
years. Their only phenotypic change amounts to trivial rearrangement of their ge-
netics and they have weathered countless competitors and environments. These
different competitors and environments — including the genetic environment caus-
ing drift — have not caused a change in the routines of the coelacanth or ginkgo
plant; they have not caused them to struggle and hence the coelacanth and ginkgo
have high fitness. In this way persistence, similar to Bouchard (2008, 2011), is a
reflection of high fitness.
A different case is that of humans. The recent global success of humans has
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shown we can survive in, and resist the difficulties presented by, many different
environments and therefore have a high fitness. Humans are a different case than
the living fossils because we demonstrate that persistence is not a critical factor;
our species hasn’t existed in its modern form for more than a few million years, at
most.Whereas we infer the coelacanth has somehow withstood the environmental
changes that have happened over the course of history, we withstand many modern
environments and competitors.
Now lets return to Tutt’s famous moths. The Dark Moths did not struggle
during the environmental change of the British Industrial Revolution whereas the
Light Moths did. Appealing to N = fs allows us to make a relative judgement of
the fitness of the two populations. Since the environmental change was the same,
N is constant, say 1 for the sake of the argument. The Light Moths struggled more
than the Dark Moths did, so in that environment sLight is Big and sDark is Small.
Therefore the fitness of the Light Moths is 1/Big, which is lower than the fitness
of the Dark Moths, 1/Small.
If we imagine that a subpopulation of the Light Moths were able to adapt fast
enough to avoid annihilation, perhaps turning into Gray Moths, then these Gray
Moths would have a fitness in between the Light and Dark. The Dark moths were
able to resist the struggles, meaning they had the highest fitness. The unadapting
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Light Moths were unable to resist the struggles, eventually leading to their dying
off. The adapting Light Moths, the future Gray Moths, were able to resist more
of the struggles by rapidly changing their phenotype. This rapid adaptation—
changing the rate of adaptation—allowed the Gray Moths to resist the struggle the
environmental change posed better than the Light Moths, but not shake it off as
easily of the Dark Moths, meaning that the fitness of the Gray Moths is in between
that of the Light and Dark.
Another way to measure Natural Selection, and fitness derivatively, is to see
how much force is needed to oppose it. To formalize this, we can take inspiration
from Hooke’s Law in physics. Hooke’s law, F = −kx, states we can measure
a force (F ) acting on a mass by connecting the mass to a spring and suspending
in the direction opposing the force (e.g. a supermarket basket scale). By knowing
how rigid the spring is (k) and measuring how far the spring has stretched (x)
when the connected mass is lifted, we can determine the force acting on the mass:
the farther the spring has stretched, the greater the force acting on the object, and
the greater the mass of the object.
Similarly we can estimate the Natural Selection on a population by opposing
this force: if a population is going extinct, the amount of work we have to do
to save it should be equal to the force against it. If a population is doing very
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well for itself, say some virus, then the amount of effort it takes for us to contain
the outbreak indicates the Natural Selection we are acting against. This gives us,
N = −kbxb such that kb is the sophistication of our method used to counteract
Natural Selection and xb is how widespread we’ve had to employ that method to
complete the task.
Consider tuberculosis, which is caused by a bacterial population that we have
had some success containing. We’ve dedicated many political and biomedical re-
sources to its containment, e.g. developing tests for TB and regulating testing for
populations like university students in the United States. This means kb is very
high since these are highly sophisticated coordinated efforts. We have also been
doing this for a long time and across many universities, meaning xb is also large.
This implies that the force of Natural Selection was high and, derivatively, tuber-
culosis bacterium has a high fitness. If we now consider that some strains have
begun to resist our attempts to contain them, as witnessed by the drug resistant
forms of the disease, we can conclude that these strains are even fitter than the
previous ones because we will have to expend even more resources to resist them.
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5.1 Cornerstones
5.1.1 The Survival of the Fittest
The fittest, according to Relativistic Biology, are the most resistant to struggle, or,
resistant to changes in the rate of phenotypic change. Hence there is no specific
reliance on reproduction rates.
However, this does not mean the end of the Survival of the Fittest. Consider
two populations of very similar organisms with the only difference being one pop-
ulation has many individuals and the other has very few. The small population
may even be a tiny subset of the large population. Now consider the large popula-
tion’s resistance to struggle: for any significant change in its routines to occur, it
must happen across many individuals. Since the population is large, this change
would take a long time and consistent environmental or competitive challenge—a
large force—to affect the population.
Now consider the small population. Since that population is small, any change
in a few of the individuals will be enough to change that overall population. Hence
it will not take much time nor significant environmental or competitive struggle to
change this population.
This example shows that more numerous populations are more inherently re-
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sistant to struggles than a less numerous population of similar phenotype, by way
of the law of large numbers. If everything else is equal, e.g. enough living space
and food, it follows that increasing the population increases resistance to strug-
gle. Likewise, decreasing the population decreases resistance to struggle. Hence
the Survival of the Fittest survives under relativity insofar as those who do not
survive, those who decrease in number, will decrease in fitness, the resistance to
struggle.
Classical survival and reproductive rate based fitness theories are then vindi-
cated, in part, since increases in population can indicate increases in resistance to
change in the rate of phenotypic change. However, reproduction is now no longer
the fundamental metric of fitness but one method of increasing it.
5.1.2 Drift
As mentioned above, many theories of evolution include drift (Plutynski, 2007;
Beatty, 1984; Mills and Beatty, 1979; Millstein, 2002; Millstein et al., 2009;
Walsh, 2007, 2010; Matthen, 2010). Darwin said in the Origin (Darwin, 1964,
81), “Variations neither useful nor injurious would not be affected by natural se-
lection, and would be left a fluctuating element. . . ” Generally drift can then be
thought of as alternative way that populations can change separate from Natural
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Selection. However, drift is part of fitness in relativistic biology and hence not
separate from Natural Selection.
To understand this, recall the fundamental uninterpreted definition of fitness:
Fitness is a property that indicates resistance to change in the rate of phenotypic
change. Hence it is presupposed in the definition of fitness that there is some
rate of phenotypic change; natural selection is only recognized with changes of
resistance to changes in this rate.
Having a non-zero rate of change should therefore be seen as an adaptive trait
of a population. Except for living fossils, which have an extremely high fitness
to begin with, a population that has no new adaptations will soon lose out to one
that does adapt, and hence a certain degree of variability is necessary in order to
generate potential new adaptations. The degree of variability is a critical factor
to a population: too little variability and the population will become susceptible
to faster adapting competition, and too much variability will yield an unstable,
splintered population. Hence sources of variability, such as drift, play an essential
role in a population’s resistance to struggle, and are not some alternative to Natural
Selection.
From the relativistic perspective all changes can be seen as the result of Nat-
ural Selection, given the right frame of reference. Contrary to Millstein (2009),
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being able to select the ‘relevant level’ at will (see Section 5.2.3 below) does dis-
solve the distinction between selection and drift, but is not problematic. Imagine
there is some change in a human population that could be considered an exam-
ple of drift, such as a rise in blue eye color. While eye color has no effect on
the rate of phenotypic change of humans, if we look at the gene level, the situa-
tion is different. According to gene-level accounts (Dawkins, 2006; Sterelny and
Kitcher, 1988; Gardner and Welch, 2011), the gene for blue eyes has increased
in replication and hence has an increased fitness. Likewise, the relativistic ac-
count would view the increased number of genes for blue eyes as an increase in
their (the population of genes for blue eyes) resistance to change, as described in
Section 5.1.1 above. Hence what looks like an unimportant change at the human
level is relevant at the gene level. This result is general to the relativistic position:
all biological change is due to Natural Selection on some level or another. As
the example shows, though, explaining Natural Selection is a matter of carefully
understanding which population is relevant to the change.
Therefore, although there is no longer drift as traditionally conceived, it re-
mains as a fundamental source of variability critical to fitness.3
3There will also be a limit on the precision of the measurement and difficulties in making
observations—both an uncertainty principle and ‘special’ relativistic concerns—which also need
to be taken into account. These are cases that I hope to return to in the future.
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5.2 Non-Darwinian Inheritance
There has been a growing literature of non-Darwinian evolutionary factors that
some consider a challenge to contemporary evolutionary theory (Jablonka and
Lamb, 2005; Pigliucci et al., 2010; Laland et al., 2013, 2014). Though discussing
Darwinian edge-case phenomena in detail is well beyond the scope here, General
Relativistic Biology has theoretic resources to straight-forwardly understand and
explain non-(straight-forwardly)-Darwinian biological inheritance. Far from pre-
senting difficulties, these Darwinian edge cases provide paradigmatic examples of
the benefits of the relativistic approach.
5.2.1 Lamarckism and Epigenetics
A new issue of biological inheritance has been recognized by the recent study of
epigenetics. Epigenetics has shown that certain genetic changes, but not to the
DNA sequence, acquired during the life of an individual can be passed on to off-
spring. This is independent of traditional Darwinian inheritance which treats the
hereditary material as separate from the environmental situation of an individual
and does not address how an organism lived, other than its reproductive rates. In-
heritance due to epigenetic changes have been refered to as a new Lamarckism
(Jablonka and Lamb, 1995, 2005) harkening back to Lamarck’s pre-Darwinian
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theory of biological change.
Explaining the fitness benefit of epigenetic change under relativity is straight-
forward. Epigenetics allow for one phenotype to have different states by regulat-
ing gene activity. If one state is better in a certain environment — it allows for
greater resistance to struggle — and this is passed along to offspring, then the
benefit is passed along. Later, if the situation changes, the organisms are able to
morph into a new state. Since both states were already part of the one phenotype,
all struggles were resisted by that phenotype.
If we compare this situation to a population that does not use epigenetics,
one or both of the different environments may have caused that population to
struggle. This population would have either 1) increased the rate of adaptation
in order to survive at its current level, that is, changed the rate of phenotypic
change, decreasing fitness, or 2) died off, at least in part, again decreasing fitness
as described in Section 5.1.1 above.
Hence the greater phenotypic plasticity epigenetics provides means fewer new
adaptations are needed to survive different struggles, and therefore epigentics in-
creases a population’s fitness.
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5.2.2 Niche Construction
Organisms change their environment in ways beneficial to how they live, and these
environmental changes are left to their offspring, who, in turn, benefit from these
changes. This creates an environmental-population feedback loop called Niche
construction (Laland et al., 2013). The niche supports the population’s way of
life, and the population works to maintain the niche.
Niche construction is considered non-Darwinian because, like epigenetics, the
changes are made during the life of the individual and are then passed on to the
offspring. Moreover, the niche is a relationship between the population and its
environment and, hence, is a different kind of thing than the hereditary material
passed on in Darwinian evolution.
As noted above in Section 4.4, the environment and the organisms mutually
interact, and in Section 4.2, the routines of life, which include modifying the local
environment, are a fundamental part of the relativistic theory. Hence identifying
and understanding Niche construction follows from the definitions of the relativis-
tic theory.
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5.2.3 Units and Levels of Selection
An artifact of understanding evolution in terms of reproductive rates is that it is
necessary to determine the unit that is reproducing and what counts as reproduc-
tion (Lloyd, 2012; Okasha, 2006). Without answers to what the fundamental unit
is and what counts as reproduction, such as genes (Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988;
Dawkins, 2006), individual organisms (Bouchard and Rosenberg, 2004) or pop-
ulations of organisms (Millstein, 2006; Godfrey-Smith, 2009), identifying cases
of evolution as distinct from other kinds of change is difficult. As argued by
(Bouchard, 2011, 113) and (Gilbert et al., 2012, 336), identifying specific units
is not just difficult, but impossible, and hence a significant departure from the
current approach is called for.
For instance, the Quaking Aspen (Grant, 1993; Bouchard, 2011) can produce
what appears to be a forest, but instead is really a single huge organism connected
underground by runners. Though it can reproduce sexually, often one initial as-
pen sends out these runners, creating new “trees” and taking up ever more space.
While we initially might perceive many organisms, they are all one interconnected
plant that can live many thousands of years. Since this one plant expands but does
not reproduce in a traditional fashion, determining its Darwinian fitness is diffi-
cult.
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We could, with Bouchard (2008, 2011), hold a differential persistence view of
fitness, e.g. “compare. . . relative fitness in terms of. . . capacity to still be there in x
number of years” (Bouchard, 2008, 569). Though long term persistence provides
benefits in many cases that don’t fit easily within prior theories, it piggy-backs on
the causal account of evolution like the Statisticalists mentioned above. For in-
stance, consider the differential persistence, and hence fitness, of Mount Everest.
Since the mountain has persisted for a long time and will likely continue to persist,
it must have high fitness. We can make this claim about the mountain’s fitness be-
cause differential persistence makes no reference to any biological property, be it
the struggle for life, reproduction, or some other biological phenomenon. This im-
plies that the differential persistence view is dependent upon other, prior theories
of evolution, similar to the statistical interpretation above: In order to apply the
differential persistence view to biological evolution, we must already have known
where biological evolution occurs. Therefore, even though differential persistence
does often track the results of evolutionary fitness, in widening evolutionary the-
ory to be more inclusive towards the variety of life, differential persistence widens
it too far.
The issue of finding specific units or levels is side-stepped by relativity since
it does not prioritize reproduction. As noted above in Section 4.3, relativistic
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biology is concerned with any individual or group that resists changes to its phe-
notypic rate of change. Moreover, with respect to the fundamental unit or popula-
tion it acts upon, relativistic biology is fundamentally undetermined. The General
Principle of Biological Relativity states that all ecologies are essentially equivalent
for the formulation of the general laws of biology, which means no environment
or level has priority over another.
Returning to the Quaking Aspen, we can appeal to niche construction as well
as a modified argument for reproduction. First, by taking up lots of space and
being able to transport nutrients via the underground runners, it can more quickly
inhabit space than competition, making a niche efficiently (Bouchard, 2011, 112).
Secondly, expanding in space can be seen analogously to expanding in population
along the same lines as discussed in Section 5.1.1 above: having a larger spa-
cial footprint makes the Aspen more resistant to any localized problem, just like
having more individuals.
Noble (2012) argues that level relativity has already been implemented by sys-
tems biologists and integrative physiologists. By first showing both upward and
downward causation within heart cell models, he then generalizes to a theory of
multi-level feedback. He states, “a priori, there is no priveleged level of causation
in biological systems,” (Noble, 2012, 6) that is, biological causation applies at all
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levels.
Hence identifying a base unit and its associated ecology is no longer a funda-
mental requirement of evolutionary theory; according to the General Principle, it
cannot be. Natural Selection may act upon any and all groups comprised of any
kind of unit. We may investigate the most relevant unit or level in a particular case
of Natural Selection—be it a gene or group of dissimilar individuals—but this is
an empirical biological question, not a theoretical problem.
6 Conclusion
The focus of this paper was to provide the philosophical basis for, and show the
biological usefulness of, evolutionary relativity, such that the initial philosophical
problems motivate the biological theory, and the useful applications of the theory
lend plausibility to the underlying concepts. Given the success of this scheme,
General Relativistic Biology presents a viable alternative to Darwinian Evolution
that yields new insights and theoretic tools, while preserving the core, canonical
scientific research program.
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